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Abstract
Our understanding of cognition has been advanced by two traditionally non-
overlapping and non-interacting groups. Mathematical psychologists rely on
behavioral data to evaluate formal models of cognition, whereas cognitive
neuroscientists rely on statistical models to understand patterns of neural
activity, often without any attempt to make a connection to the mechanism
supporting the computation. Both approaches suffer from critical limitations
as a direct result of their focus on data at one level of analysis (cf. Marr,
1982), and these limitations have inspired researchers to attempt to combine
both neural and behavioral measures in a cross-level integrative fashion. The
importance of solving this problem has spawned several entirely new theoreti-
cal and statistical frameworks developed by both mathematical psychologists
and cognitive neuroscientists. However, with each new approach comes a par-
ticular set of limitations and benefits. In this article, we survey and charac-
terize several approaches for linking brain and behavioral data. We organize
these approaches on the basis of particular cognitive modeling goals: (1) us-
ing the neural data to constrain a behavioral model, (2) using the behavioral
model to predict neural data, and (3) fitting both neural and behavioral data
simultaneously. Within each goal, we highlight a few particularly success-
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ful approaches for accomplishing that goal, and discuss some applications.
Finally, we provide a conceptual guide to choosing among various analytic
approaches in performing model-based cognitive neuroscience.
Keywords: model-based cognitive neuroscience, linking, analysis methods
1. Introduction1
Our understanding of cognition has been advanced by two nearly non-2
overlapping and non-interacting groups. The first group, mathematical psy-3
chologists, is strongly motived by theoretical accounts of cognitive processes,4
and instantiates these theories by developing formal models of cognition.5
The models often assume a system of computations and mathematical equa-6
tions intended to characterize a process that might actually take place in the7
brain. To formally test their theory, mathematical psychologists rely on their8
model’s ability to fit behavioral data. A good fit is thought to reflect an ac-9
curate theory, whereas a bad fit would refute it (Roberts and Pashler, 2000).10
The second group, cognitive neuroscientists, rely on statistical models to un-11
derstand patterns of neural activity, often without any attempt to make a12
connection to the computations that might underlie some hypothesized mech-13
anism. For example, some statistical approaches (e.g., multivariate pattern14
analysis) explicitly condition on the neural data to determine which aspects15
of the data produce better predictions for behavioral outcomes. Such an16
analysis can tell us which brain regions are predictive of a particular behav-17
ior and even by how much, but they say nothing about neither how nor why18
particular brain regions produce said behavior.19
Although both groups are concerned with explaining behavior, they tend20
to approach the challenge from different vantage points. Thinking in terms of21
Marr (1982)’s levels of analysis, mathematical psychologists tend to focus on22
the computational and algorithmic levels, whereas cognitive neuroscientists23
focus more on the implementation level. Although progress can be made24
by maintaining a tight focus, certain opportunities are missed. As a result25
of their single-level focus, both approaches suffer from critical limitations26
(Love, 2015). Without a cognitive model to guide the inferential process,27
cognitive neuroscientists are often (1) unable to interpret their results from28
a mechanistic point of view, (2) unable to address many phenomena when29
restricted to contrast analyses, and (3) unable to bring together results from30
different paradigms in a common theoretical framework. On the other hand,31
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the cognitive models developed by mathematical psychologists are inherently32
abstract, and the importance of physiology and brain function is often un-33
appreciated. After fitting a model to data, mathematical psychologists can34
describe an individual’s behavior, but they can say nothing about the behav-35
ior’s neural basis. More importantly, neural data can provide information36
that can help distinguish between competing cognitive models that cannot37
be uniquely identified based on fits to behavioral data alone (Ditterich, 2010;38
Mack et al., 2013; Purcell et al., 2012).39
The many limitations of single-level analyses have inspired researchers40
to combine neural and behavioral measures in an integrative fashion. The41
importance of solving the integration problem has spawned several entirely42
new statistical modeling approaches developed through collaborations be-43
tween mathematical psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, collectively44
forming a new field often referred to as model-based cognitive neuroscience45
(e.g., Forstmann et al., 2011; van Maanen et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2013b;46
Mack et al., 2013; Palmeri, 2014; Boehm et al., 2014; Love, 2015; Palmeri47
et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2015b). We refer to these as “approaches”, because48
they are general strategies for integrating neural and behavioral measures via49
cognitive models, and are neither restricted to any particular kind of neural50
or behavioral measure, nor any particular cognitive model. However, with51
each new approach comes a unique set of limitations and benefits. The ap-52
proaches that have emerged in the recent years fill an entire spectrum of53
information flow between neural and behavioral levels of analysis, and de-54
ciding between them can be difficult. Given the overwhelming demand for55
these integrative strategies, we believe that an article surveying the different56
types of analytic approaches could be an invaluable guide for any would-be57
model-based cognitive neuroscientist.58
Here we survey and characterize the many approaches for linking brain59
and behavioral data. We organize these different approaches into three gen-60
eral categories: (1) using the neural data to constrain a behavioral model,61
(2) using the behavioral model to predict neural data, and (3) modeling62
both neural and behavioral data simultaneously. For each specific approach63
within each category, we highlight a few particularly successful examples, and64
discuss some applications. In an attempt to draw a detailed comparison be-65
tween the approaches, we then organize each of the approaches according to a66
variety of factors: the number of processing steps, the commitment to a par-67
ticular theory, the type of information flow, the difficulty of implementation,68
and the type of exploration. In short, we discuss the ways in which current69
3
approaches bind data at multiple levels of analysis, and speculate about how70
these methods can productively constrain theory. We close with a discussion71
about additional considerations in model-based cognitive neuroscience, and72
provide an outlook toward future development.73
2. Specific Analytic Approaches74
For ease of categorization and subsequent comparison, we will hypothet-75
ically assume the presence of neural data, denoted N , and behavioral data,76
denoted B, which may or may not have been collected simultaneously. The77
neural data N could be neurophysiological recordings, functional magnetic78
resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), or other physi-79
ological measures. The behavioral data B could be response probabilities,80
response times, confidence ratings, or other typical behavioral data collected81
in a cognitive experiment. Cognitive modelers are interested in character-82
izing the mechanisms – specified in mathematical and computational terms83
– that lead to the behavior B observed in a given experimental condition.84
Commonly, this characterization is derived from fitting a cognitive model to85
behavioral data, interpreting the resulting parameter estimates, and compar-86
ing (qualitatively or quantitatively) the observed behavior and the behavior87
predicted by the model. Cognitive neuroscientists are interested in uncover-88
ing the neural mechanisms that lead to the behavior B observed in a given89
experimental condition. Commonly, this process involves a statistical analy-90
sis of neural data with respect to observed behaviors and experimental ma-91
nipulations. However, model-based cognitive neuroscientists are interested in92
integrating neurophysiological information N and behavioral outcomes B by93
way of a cognitive model. The central assumption of these analyses is that94
information obtained from either source of data (N or B) can tell a similar95
story – albeit in different languages – about some aspect of cognition, and96
the integration of the these measures assimilates the differences in languages97
across data modalities.98
As model-based cognitive neuroscientists, we have many choices in decid-99
ing which story we would like to tell, and these choices depend on our research100
goals. In practice, there seems to be at least three general categories of ap-101
proaches in the emerging field of model-based cognitive neuroscience. These102
three categories are illustrated in the rows of Figure 1. The first set of ap-103
proaches uses neural data as auxiliary information that guides or constrains104
a behavioral model. There are several ways in which the neural data can105
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Figure 1: An illustration of several approaches used for linking neural and behavioral
data, organized by specific modeling goals. N represents the neural data, B represents the
behavioral data, N∗ represents simulated internal model states, and θ, δ, and Ω represent
model parameters. When an approach is procedural, progression through processing stages
is represented by arrows of decreasing darkness (e.g., the Latent Input Approach). Dashed
lines indicate conceptual constraints (e.g., the Theoretical Approach), whereas solid lines
indicate statistical constraints.
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constrain modeling choices, and we will discuss three such approaches in the106
subsequent sections. The second set of approaches uses a behavioral model107
as a way to interpret or predict neural data. Behavioral models assume a set108
of mechanisms that theoretically mimic a cognitive process of interest, mak-109
ing them an interesting way to impose theory in data analyses. Moreover,110
while competing cognitive models might predict the same or similar patterns111
of behavioral data B, they might differ considerably in what they predict112
about neural data N , creating a powerful approach to model selection. We113
are faced with many choices in using these model mechanisms to guide our114
search for the interesting neural signatures. In the sections that follow, we115
will discuss two such approaches for accomplishing this goal. The third set of116
approaches builds a single model that jointly accounts for the random varia-117
tion present in both the neural and behavioral data. With the proper model118
in place, one can simultaneously achieve constraint on the behavioral model119
while retaining the ability to interpret the neural data. In the sections that120
follow, we will discuss two approaches designed to accomplish this goal. We121
do not necessarily think this is a comprehensive list; in fact, we suspect that122
there is room for further development, and possibly the creation of entirely123
new analytic approaches.124
Figure 1 represents the specific approaches as graphical diagrams where125
observable measures (i.e., data) are depicted as shaded square nodes, latent126
model parameters are depicted as empty circles, and arrows depict depen-127
dencies. Two of these approaches (i.e., Two-stage and Latent Input) require128
several processing stages, and we have represented the dependency struc-129
ture of these stages as increasingly lighter shades of gray. Most of these130
approaches require a transformation from the data space to a (latent) pa-131
rameter space, and this transformation can be unimodal (i.e., concerning132
only behavior data B or neural data N) or bimodal (i.e., concerning both133
B and N simultaneously). The parameters can define a mechanistic model,134
like those commonly used by cognitive modelers, or they can define a statis-135
tical model, like those commonly used by cognitive neuroscientists. When an136
unimodal transformation is required, we denote the parameters of the neural137
model which predict N as δ, and the parameters of the behavioral model138
which predict B as θ. The neural model parameters δ might be slopes or139
intercept terms from a general linear model, or something more sophisticated140
like those used in topographic latent source analysis (Gershman et al., 2011).141
The behavioral model parameters θ represent things like discriminability in142
the signal detection theory model (Green and Swets, 1966), or the drift rate143
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in the “diffusion decision model”2 (Ratcliff, 1978; Forstmann et al., 2015).144
When a bimodal transformation is required, we generically denote the pa-145
rameters as θ (e.g., the Integrative Approach in the bottom-right panel of146
Figure 1). For example, in the ACT-R framework (Anderson, 2007), the147
set of parameters θ represents a sequence of module activations, and their148
values have bimodal effects in the prediction of both neural and behavioral149
measures. Some approaches in our set require a simulation process where150
the parameters are used to generate synthetic data, and we will denote these151
data with an asterisk (e.g., N∗ denotes predicted neural data in the Latent152
Input Approach). Other approaches assume a secondary projection from a153
set of several parameter spaces to a group-level parameter space, such as in154
hierarchical modeling. We denote these higher-level parameters as Ω (e.g.,155
the Joint Modeling Approach in the bottom-left panel of Figure 1). As an156
example, the joint modeling framework (Turner et al., 2013b) uses a hierar-157
chical (Bayesian) structure for bridging the connection between neural and158
behavioral measures. With these general assumptions and notation in place,159
we can discuss how these various approaches achieve their intended analytic160
goal.161
2.1. Neural Data Constrain Behavioral Model162
We begin our discussion with approaches that constrain a behavioral163
model with neural data. In this endeavor, the neural data are considered164
important, but only in the sense that they inform the mechanisms in the be-165
havioral model. We have identified three specific approaches (i.e., see Figure166
1): the Theoretical Approach, the Two-stage Behavioral Approach, and the167
Direct Input Approach. We now discuss each of these in turn.168
2.1.1. Theoretical Approach169
In the Theoretical Approach, psychological theories are developed on the170
basis of considerations from both neuroscience and behavioral data. The top171
left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the Theoretical Approach as statistically172
independent models of the neural and behavioral data because the link be-173
tween these measures is established only through the researcher themselves174
(i.e., represented by the dashed arrow). In this approach, the dominant175
2In this article, we refer to this model as the “diffusion decision model” following
Forstmann et al. (2015). This same model has been called other names such as the “the
diffusion model”, the “drift diffusion model”, and the “Wiener diffusion model.”
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procedure uses neural measures to inspire the development of psychological176
models. First, the researcher observes particular aspects of brain function,177
such as information about the structure (e.g., individual neurons or densely178
connected brain regions) or function (e.g., dorsal and ventral pathways of vi-179
sual stimulus processing) of the brain. Next, the researcher develops a model180
of behavior that, at its core, abides by these neural observations. With an181
initial model structure imposed by N , the researcher is now able to evaluate182
the relative merits of nested theoretical assumptions, and make incremental183
adjustments in the model to provide better fits to behavioral data B. Un-184
like other approaches discussed in this article, the Theoretical Approach may185
draw inspiration from physiological or anatomical observations, but there is186
no mathematical or statistical link between the neural data N and either the187
model architecture or the model parameters that predict the behavioral data188
B.189
Although the absence of an explicit link between neural and behavioral190
data may seem craven, the Theoretical Approach has proven to be a powerful191
framework for motivating psychological theory. Perhaps the most prominent192
example of a Theoretical Approach is the enormous class of neural network193
models. Neural network models have a long history, with one classic example194
being Rosenblatt’s Perceptron machine (Rosenblatt, 1961). In the develop-195
ment of the Perceptron, Rosenblatt made choices in his model that reflected196
operations observed in individual neurons, such as that the firing of individ-197
ual neurons should be discrete (motivated by the McCullogh-Pitts neuron;198
McCullogh and Pitts, 1943). Although these original neural network models199
were heavily criticized (Minsky and Papert, 1969), pioneering work allowing200
for continuous activations in neuron-like units (Grossberg, 1978; Anderson,201
1977; Rumelhart, 1977; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart and202
McClelland, 1982) evolved neural network models into more complex and203
successful theoretical approaches such as the parallel distributed process-204
ing (PDP; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986) models. Superficially, these205
models allow for the presence of individual nodes embedded within layers206
of a network, and these nodes are massively interconnected across layers,207
resembling neural structures in the brain. Through a process known as back-208
propagation, PDP models can be trained on behavioral data to learn impor-209
tant aspects of the decision rule, facilitating further systematic explorations210
of representation, learning, and selective influence (i.e., by a process referred211
to as “lesioning”).212
As another example, consider the Leaky Competing Accumulator (LCA;213
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Usher and McClelland, 2001) model. The LCA model was proposed as a neu-214
rally plausible model for choice response time in a k-alternative task. The215
model possesses mechanisms that extend other diffusion-type models (e.g.,216
Ratcliff, 1978) by including leakage and competition by means of lateral in-217
hibition. These additional mechanisms have proven effective in explaining218
how, for example, time sensitive stimulus information can give way to differ-219
ences in individual subject performance. For example, Usher and McClelland220
(2001) and Tsetsos et al. (2011) have shown the effects of primacy and re-221
cency for some subjects in a time-varying stimulus information paradigm. In222
these multi-alternative choice experiments, one response option may receive223
the strongest “input” (e.g., the brightness level) for the first 500 ms, but224
then the stimuli transition such that a different response option receives the225
strongest input relative to the first. In both of these studies, different param-226
eterizations of the LCA model were used to demonstrate how primacy effects227
could be appreciated by having a large value for lateral inhibition relative228
to the strength of the input (i.e., the drift rate), and recency effects could229
be captured through a large leakage term relative to the input (Usher and230
McClelland, 2001; Tsetsos et al., 2011).231
As a specific example of how the neurosciences have guided the assump-232
tions in the LCA model, it is well known that the firing rate of individual233
neurons can never be negative. However, these firing rates can be attenuated234
by way of inhibition – a process carried out by other neurons in the system.235
To instantiate these neuronal dynamics, the full LCA model enforces a con-236
straint such that if the degree of evidence for any choice alternative becomes237
negative, the degree of evidence for that accumulator should be reset to zero238
(Usher and McClelland, 2001). The floor-on-activation constraint was later239
found to be critical in capturing patterns of individual differences in multi-240
alternative choice that could not be captured by other diffusion-type models241
(Tsetsos et al., 2011). It is worth noting that other neurological constraints242
allow the LCA model to provide a unique characterization of behavioral data243
that would not otherwise be realized; specifically, the role of lateral inhibi-244
tion relative to leakage in the model plays an interesting role in characterizing245
subject-specific patterns in behavioral data (Bogacz et al., 2006; van Raven-246
zwaaij et al., 2012; Tsetsos et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2011; Bogacz et al., 2007;247
Purcell et al., 2012; Teodorescu and Usher, 2013; Tsetsos et al., 2012; Ossmy248
et al., 2013; Turner and Sederberg, 2014; Turner et al., 2015a).249
Given the highly subjective nature of the neural constraints imposed on250
a behavioral model, it should not be surprising that a great deal of contro-251
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versy surrounds some applications of the Theoretical Approach. While neu-252
ral network modelers have undoubtedly derived inspiration from the brain253
in building their models, the mechanistic implementation of these inspira-254
tions is often interpreted as a strong commitment, which opens the gates255
for scrutiny about plausibility and falsifiability (Minsky and Papert, 1969;256
Massaro, 1988; Roberts and Pashler, 2000). Furthermore, in some cases these257
additional neural mechanisms do not provide any advantage in terms of quan-258
titative fit statistics to behavioral data over their simpler counterparts (e.g.,259
see Ratcliff and Smith (2004), but also see Teodorescu and Usher (2013) and260
Turner et al. (2015a) for a different perspective). In some cases, there are261
also concerns centered on the level of explanation that the model provides (cf.262
Marr, 1982). On the one hand, the study of individual neurons constitutes263
an exploration of Marr’s implementation level of analysis (Broadbent, 1985;264
Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008; Pinker and Prince, 1988; Smolensky, 1988). On265
the other, the development of a cognitive model involves meandering through266
the computational level – Marr’s highest level of analysis (Shiffrin and No-267
bel, 1997). To what extent should the implementation level be reflected or268
imposed on the computational level (e.g., Love, 2015; Frank, 2015; Teller,269
1984)? For example, if we believe that individual neurons have a floor on270
activation or are inherently “leaky” (i.e., meaning they lose information over271
time), should this restriction be imposed on the dynamics of racing accu-272
mulators in a cognitive model (Zandbelt et al., 2015)? These accumulators273
are intended to reflect the amount of sensory evidence for each alternative274
– evidence that is apparently observed in many brain areas (including the275
lateral intraparietal area, superior colliculus, frontal eye field, and dorsolat-276
eral prefrontal cortex; Horwitz and Newsome, 1999, 2001; Kim and Shadlen,277
1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001, 1996; Purcell et al., 2010, 2012; Hanes and278
Schall, 1996; Hanks et al., 2015), and so it begs the question: Which – if any279
– levels of decision making models should reflect the function of individual280
neurons? If the accumulators are to reflect the behavior of individual neu-281
rons, how might this connection be formally established (Smith, 2010; Smith282
and McKenzie, 2011)? Questions like this have been considered by many283
other scientists (e.g., Marr, 1982; Broadbent, 1985; Love, 2015; Frank, 2015;284
Schall, 2004; Teller, 1984), and the next two sections discuss two different285
ideas about how this connection should be made.286
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2.1.2. Two-stage Behavioral Approach287
The first formal linking approach uses neurophysiology to replace param-288
eters of a behavioral model. For example, consider a model that explains289
some neural data N with parameters δ, and behavioral data B with param-290
eters θ. The neural parameters δ could be divided into a set of parameters291
characterizing a key neural signal δ1, and a set of nuisance parameters δ2 so292
that δ = {δ1, δ2}. Now suppose the behavioral model parameters could be293
divided into a set of parameters that are reflective of the behavioral signal294
θ1, and a set of parameters θ2 that are not. The structure of the Two-stage295
Behavioral Approach is to simply replace the set of parameters θ1 with the296
parameters of the neural signal δ1. We refer to this approach as the “Two-297
stage Behavioral” approach because the connection involves two stages, and298
that behavioral model parameters are replaced by neural parameters. This299
approach makes a strong commitment to how the neural signal is represented300
in the abstract mechanisms assumed by the behavioral model, and as a re-301
sult, it is a stronger instantiation of neurophysiology than the Theoretical302
Approach discussed above.303
The Two-stage Behavioral Approach is nicely illustrated by the work of304
Wang and colleagues (Wong and Wang, 2006), who developed a spiking neu-305
ral network model of perceptual decision making. This model aims to account306
for the same kinds of behaviors as the DDM and the LCA model, but is far307
less abstract, with thousands of simulated spiking neurons, dense patterns308
of excitatory and inhibitory connections, pools of neurons associated with a309
single response, and the dynamics of individual neurons defined by several310
differential equations. While the model has dozens of potentially free param-311
eters, most of them are defined directly by neural data. For example, the312
time constants of integration of different inhibitory and excitatory receptor313
types are based directly on physiological measures. While low-level spiking314
neural network models of this sort capture well many of the details of neurons315
and neural circuits and provide reasonable first-order predictions of behav-316
ioral data, they are difficult to simulate and quantitative fits to behavioral317
data are simply impossible using even state-of-the-art computer hardware318
(see Umakantha et al., 2015). Indeed, as a result of this additional complex-319
ity, very few efforts have been devoted to systematically studying the model’s320
predictions for choice response time data. However, a few approximations321
have been developed for fitting purposes, and these approximations behave322
similarly to popular models in cognitive science such as the LCA model323
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(Wong and Wang, 2006; Bogacz et al., 2006; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008).324
2.1.3. Direct Input Approach325
The Two-stage Behavioral Approach represents one way in which the326
neural data can guide the behavioral model through neural model parame-327
ters, but it is easy to imagine other approaches that are more direct. For328
example, rather than translating the neural data N to the neural model pa-329
rameters δ, and then using δ to constrain the behavioral model parameters330
θ, we could instead use the neural data to directly replace dynamics of the331
behavioral model. This alternative approach is nicely illustrated by the Van-332
derbilt group (e.g., Palmeri et al., 2015; Purcell et al., 2010, 2012). They333
examined perceptual decision making within the sequential sampling model334
architecture assumed by models like the DDM (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978), and335
the LCA model (Usher and McClelland, 2001), among others. They specifi-336
cally tested the hypothesis that different types of neurons in the frontal eye337
field (FEF) carry out different computations specified in accumulator mod-338
els, namely that visually-responsive neurons in FEF encode the drift rate339
driving the decision process and that movement-related neurons in FEF in-340
stantiate the accumulation process itself. To test this linking proposition341
most directly (cf. Teller, 1984; Schall, 2004), they replaced the parameter-342
ized mechanisms thought to be embodied by the visually-responsive neurons,343
namely the time for perceptual processing and the drift rate, with the neu-344
rophysiological data recorded from visually-responsive neurons. Rather than345
having abstract mathematical and computational components specified by346
free parameters drive the decision process, the neural data (N) drove the347
decision process directly. To do this, the neural data were used to directly348
replace components of the model that would otherwise have been latent, and349
would need to be estimated from behavioral data. The only remaining free350
parameters were those that defined the decision making architecture (i.e.,351
race, feedforward, lateral, or gated accumulation), and that defined speed-352
accuracy tradeoffs (i.e., threshold of accumulation). When constrained by353
neural inputs, they observed that only some of the various decision making354
architectures could fit the full set of behavioral data (correct and error re-355
sponse time distributions and response probabilities). They were then able to356
distinguish further between models based on how well the predicted accumu-357
lator model dynamics matched the observed neural dynamics in movement-358
related neurons, the neurons they hypothesized to carry out an accumulation359
of evidence (see Latent Input Approach below).360
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Although the Direct Input Approach is commonly used to feed neural361
data into a cognitive model, one could potentially invert the direction of362
influence in Figure 1 to analyze the neural data as a function of some behav-363
ioral variable, such as accuracy (e.g., Eichele et al., 2008) or response time364
(e.g., Weissman et al., 2006; Hanes and Schall, 1996). Once the neural data365
have been sorted as a function of the levels of the behavioral outcome, one366
might analyze the distribution of neural data between these levels (Woodman367
et al., 2008). Such a procedure has been the dominant analytic approach in368
neuroscience since its inception, but is not model-based, and so we will not369
consider it here. However, the model-based analogue of this analysis would370
be to use the model’s machinery to drive the analysis of neural data. We refer371
to this approach as the Latent Input Approach, and will discuss it further in372
the next section.373
2.2. Behavioral Model Predicts Neural Data374
Another set of analytic approaches involves searching the brain for areas375
that support mechanisms assumed in the behavioral model. Such a procedure376
allows one to interpret neural data through mechanisms in the model, which377
can potentially be more informative than behavioral data alone. We consider378
two approaches for accomplishing this goal: the Latent Input and the Two-379
stage Neural Approaches.380
2.2.1. Latent Input Approach381
The goal of the Latent Input Approach is a converse of sorts to the Direct382
Input Approach. In the Direct Input Approach, the goal is to use the neural383
data N to constrain model mechanisms and parameters θ that predict be-384
havior. In the Latent Input Approach, the cognitive model is used to guide385
the inference of neural data N , or to make predictions about N . To per-386
form an analysis within this approach, one typically carries out three stages,387
illustrated in the middle-left panel of Figure 1. First, the parameters of a388
cognitive model θ are estimated by fitting the model to behavioral data B389
alone. Second, the resulting parameter estimates are used to generate predic-390
tions about neural data N∗, which typically represents some “internal state”391
of the cognitive model in terms of the neural measure. Third, one searches392
for correlates of the model’s internal state N∗ with the observed neural data393
N .394
One example of an Latent Input analysis using fMRI data would be a395
voxel-by-voxel application of the general linear model relating the model’s396
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internal state N∗ to the neural data N (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2007). The397
typical result is a pattern of voxels representing significant correlations with398
the cognitive model, and these voxels are taken as the region of the brain399
supporting the mechanism assumed by the model. This univariate approach400
is commonly referred to as “model-based fMRI”, but of course any neural401
measurement could be correlated with the model measure.402
The Latent Input Approach is commonly used in reinforcement learning403
models to relate mechanisms of learning and prediction errors to the brain404
(e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2007; Gla¨scher and O’Doherty, 2010; Hamp-405
ton et al., 2006), and has been particularly powerful in the field of clinical406
neuroscience (e.g., Montague et al., 2012; Wiecki et al., 2015). One simple407
example is the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model that characterizes the process408
of learning a conditioned response through repeated presentations of a condi-409
tioned stimulus (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In the model, the value of the410
unconditioned stimulus is represented as u, and the value of the conditioned411
stimulus on Trial t is represented as vt. To learn the stimulus environment,412
the model assumes that vt is updated sequentially according to a learning413
rate parameter α, and an evaluation of the prediction error . Specifically,414
after a decision is made and the unconditioned stimulus is presented, the415
model’s internal state of the value of the conditioned stimulus is updated416
according to the rule417
vt = vt−1 + α. (1)
Eventually, the internal representation of the value v converges to u,  ap-418
proaches zero, and the model “learns” the stimulus-to-response pairing. The419
value of vt can be directly observed by assessing the strength of the condi-420
tioned response, whereas other variables are estimated by fitting the model421
to behavioral data. Typically, α remains fixed across the trials in an experi-422
ment, allowing one to derive a trial-by-trial estimate of  through Equation423
1. Hence, the model produces trial-to-trial estimates of the value of the424
conditioned stimulus v and the prediction error . As outlined above, these425
values can be entered into an fMRI analysis as a time series by convolving426
them with a hemodynamic response function (HRF), and then regressing427
the result against the fMRI data through the general linear model. However,428
the estimates v and  are not parameters; instead, they reflect the model’s429
internal state for value and prediction error, respectively. This distinction430
is important because it separates this analytic approach from other possible431
Two-stage approaches, such as in van Maanen et al. (2011), which we discuss432
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below.433
As the previous example makes clear, Latent Input Approaches can iden-434
tify candidate neural substrates for theoretical concepts, such as prediction435
error, that are not directly observable but can be defined within a cognitive436
model. Entering latent model measures into the imaging analyses is rela-437
tively straightforward. Indeed, multiple model measures can be considered438
simultaneously. For example, Davis et al. (2012) simultaneously analyzed439
cognitive operations related to recognition and representational uncertainty440
by including two related measures in the imaging analysis from a cognitive441
model fit to trial-by-trial category learning data.442
Extensions to Model Discrimination. One issue with what is commonly re-443
ferred to as model-based fMRI is that models tend to be preferred to the444
extent that they correlate with many voxels in the brain. However, it is not445
clear that this is an appropriate criterion. Because simple cognitive mod-446
els do not attempt to model every process in the brain, they should not be447
expected to account for the variance of every voxel. Furthermore, cogni-448
tive states may be coded by brain states that are defined by the pattern of449
activation over voxels. This notion of brain state is multivariate as it de-450
pends on the pattern of activity, whereas most model-based analyses focus451
on univariate correlations between a model measure and an individual voxel.452
One approach that attempts to address these deficiencies is model decod-453
ing (Mack et al., 2013). Rather than assume a single cognitive model as the454
“correct” model, this generalization acknowledges that there may be com-455
peting cognitive models of the same phenomenon and uses the neural data456
to adjudicate between those competitors. It is well known in mathemati-457
cal psychology that models assuming very different internal mechanisms can458
sometimes predict the same observed behavior. To the extent that different459
model mechanisms produce different internal model states, one way to dis-460
criminate between models predicting the same behavior is to compare those461
predicted internal model states to observed internal brain states. Models462
that predict observed behavior but cannot predict internal brain states are463
rejected.464
Consider, for example, the work of the Vanderbilt group discussed earlier465
(Palmeri et al., 2015; Purcell et al., 2010, 2012). After excluding neurally-466
constrained models that could not fit the observed behavioral data, they were467
then able to distinguish further between models based on how well the pre-468
dicted accumulator model dynamics matched the observed neural dynamics469
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in movement-related neurons, the neurons they hypothesized to carry out an470
accumulation of evidence (see also Purcell and Palmeri, 2015, in this special471
issue). Only their gated accumulator model produced accumulator dynamics472
that matched the observed dynamics of movement-related neurons in FEF.473
Consider next the recent work of Mack et al. (2013), who developed a474
strategy for evaluating different models of object categorization on the basis475
of their consistency with observed fMRI data. They specifically contrasted476
two well-known theories of category representation: exemplar and prototype477
models (see also Palmeri, 2014). Exemplar models assume that members478
of a category are explicitly stored in memory, and a categorical decision for479
a new stimulus is a function of its similarity to these remembered exem-480
plars. Prototype models assume that category representations are abstract,481
averages of experienced category examples, and a categorical decision is a482
function of similarity to the stored category prototypes. In this sense, the483
prototype representation is abstract – a category could be represented in a484
location of feature space that is not representative of any particular known485
category member. These particular theories of category representation have486
been fiercely debated for decades (e.g., Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Minda and487
Smith, 2002; Zaki et al., 2003). Indeed, in their first analysis, Mack et al.488
(2013) showed that both exemplar and prototype models provided nearly489
indistinguishable fits to the observed behavioral data.490
Even though the exemplar and prototype models make similar predictions491
about behavior, they do so by assuming very different kinds of internal rep-492
resentations. Indeed, the degree to which different test items activate these493
internal representations – similarity to stored exemplars for the exemplar494
model versus similarity to category prototypes for the prototype model – dif-495
fers considerably between the two models. Mack et al. (2013) asked whether496
the pattern of brain activity elicited by different test items would be more497
similar to the pattern of activation of internal representations for the exem-498
plar model or the prototype model. They specifically evaluated the mutual499
information shared between brain and model state using machine learning500
techniques like multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) and representational501
similarity analysis (RSA). The patterns of brain activity across trials showed502
better correspondence to the internal state of the exemplar representation503
than the prototype representation. These findings serve as a powerful exam-504
ple of how the neurosciences – combined with a Latent Input Approach –505
allow us to draw conclusions regarding competing cognitive models that we506
might not otherwise reach.507
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These model decoding approaches represent an important departure from508
the Latent Input Approach discussed above. Namely, these methods do not509
assume that the model used to interpret the neural data is correct. Instead,510
they posit a set of competing models for the underlying cognitive process,511
and the best explanation is to be determined from each model’s correspon-512
dence to the neural data. Once a cognitive model is selected, it can then be513
used as a lens on the brain data, using any existing technique, such as the514
aforementioned univariate approaches or representation similarity analysis515
(RSA). This stage of the analysis can be seen as confirmatory – the winning516
model has been established and is used to help interpret the neural data.517
Pairing model decoding with a model-based analysis approach allows for in-518
formation from brain and behavior to be mutually constraining through the519
bridge of the cognitive model. This extra step of selecting a model based520
on neural data is atypical of Latent Input Approaches, and this step is not521
illustrated in Figure 1.522
2.2.2. Two-stage Neural Approach523
The second approach we will discuss that uses behavior to predict neural524
data is related to the Two-stage Behavioral Approach discussed above, ex-525
cept that here, the parameters of the behavioral model θ are used to guide526
the analysis of the neural data N instead of vice versa. While a subset of527
neural model parameters δ could be replaced with a subset of behavioral528
model parameters θ akin to the Two-stage Behavioral Approach, in prac-529
tice, this is rarely done. Instead, relationships between θ and δ are formed530
through correlational or regression analyses. The correlational approach has531
been especially successful in the field of perceptual decision making (Mul-532
der et al., 2014). For example, Forstmann et al. (2008), Forstmann et al.533
(2010), and Mansfield et al. (2011) show in various experimental setups that534
accumulator model parameters that reflect response caution correlate with535
averaged BOLD responses in pre-supplementary motor area and striatum,536
two regions in the brain that are thought to be involved in mediating cogni-537
tive control. These studies illustrate that individual differences in behavior,538
captured by hypothesized processes, are driven by individual differences in539
how the brain works. This approach thus strengthens our understanding of540
the role of certain brain areas in cognition, but it also adds credence to the541
type of cognitive model that is adopted to describe behavior.542
In the regression approach, parameters of a behavioral model are used543
as predictors in a regression model of the neural variables. In the context544
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of fMRI, behavioral model parameters are often entered as regressors in a545
general linear model that quantifies the BOLD response in certain brain ar-546
eas (e.g., Mulder et al., 2012; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010; White et al.,547
2014). Usually, this is done in addition to regressors that relate to the ex-548
perimental manipulations, yielding statistical maps of brain activation that549
reflect the predicted change in neural activation (i.e., in δ) for a fixed change550
in behavioral model parameter (θ), in addition to the standard notion of a551
change in δ as a function of the experimental manipulation.552
Some properties of behavior are difficult to cast in experimental condi-553
tions. For example, fluctuations that occur as part of a time series of obser-554
vations are ideally analyzed as such (Wagenmakers et al., 2004). Moreover,555
these fluctuations may be related to incorrect (Dutilh et al., 2012; Eichele556
et al., 2008) or task-unrelated responses, for example due to attentional lapses557
(Weissman et al., 2006; Mittner et al., 2014). For these situations it can be558
useful to study fluctuations in brain and behavior over time.559
To understand how the variability in brain measures from trial to trial560
adds to the behavioral variability, some researchers have developed models561
in which parameters are estimated on a trial-by-trial basis (Behrens et al.,562
2007; Brunton et al., 2013; Erlich et al., 2015; Hanks et al., 2015; van Maanen563
et al., 2011). For example, Behrens et al. (2007) used an optimal model that564
updates the expected reward for one of two responses on a trial-by-trial basis.565
The parameters of this model were also updated on a trial-by-trial basis,566
based on the actual trial outcome (i.e., the choice of the participant) and the567
expected outcome (i.e., the model prediction). Behrens and colleagues found568
that the level at which participants were responsive to changes in the rewards569
was predictive of anterior cingulate cortex activation on a trial-by-trial basis,570
supporting the idea that anterior cingulate cortex activation reflects changes571
in the environment (e.g., Rushworth et al., 2009).572
A slightly different approach was taken by Van Maanen and colleagues573
(van Maanen et al., 2011; Ho et al., 2012; Boehm et al., 2014). Using the574
LBA model, these authors estimated the most likely combination of drift575
rate and starting point of evidence accumulation, given the distribution of576
these parameters across trials. The most likely combination of parameters is577
determined by the set of parameters that specify the response time. While578
powerful, this method is difficult because the most likely parameter estimates579
are highly uncertain, due to the large variability in the joint distribution of580
the model parameters, and due to the simplification of the model to include581
only two sources of variability. Nevertheless, van Maanen et al. (2011) showed582
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that trial-to-trial fluctuations in BOLD in pre-supplementary motor area583
correlated with the trial-to-trial measure of threshold, but only for speed-584
stressed trials. This finding was corroborated by Boehm et al. (2014), who585
found a similar correlation between the trial-to-trial model parameter and586
a trial-to-trial estimate of the Contingent Negative Variation (CNV). The587
CNV is a slow rising potential, thought to represent neural activation in a588
cortico-basal ganglia loop including the supplementary/pre-supplementary589
motor areas (Nagai et al., 2004; Plichta et al., 2013).590
Although the Two-stage Neural Approach has been instrumental in elu-591
cidating various mechanistic explanations of neural data, the framework ne-592
glects an important source of constraint. Namely, by analyzing the neural593
and behavioral data independently, the secondary analysis does not statis-594
tically guide our understanding of how these variables are related. In this595
way, Two-stage frameworks are not statistically reciprocal because the neural596
data cannot influence the parameter estimates of the behavioral model (cf.597
Forstmann et al., 2011). To accomplish such a goal, a framework would need598
to automatically learn the covariation of the neural and behavioral parame-599
ters in harmony with the analysis of the neural and behavioral data. Such a600
framework is the topic discussed in the next section: Simultaneous Modeling.601
2.3. Simultaneous Modeling602
At this point, we have discussed two general analytic approaches that603
apply unidirectional statistical influence: modeling and analysis of one source604
of data guides the modeling and analysis of another source. The primary605
motivation of these approaches is that one measure is particularly well suited606
for answering a key theoretical question. In this way, one measure carries607
more “theoretical importance” than the other. However, some modeling608
approaches are agnostic in specifying which measure is more important, and609
instead posit a bidirectional link between the two measures. Similar to the610
subdivisions in other research goals above, the level at which the link is611
established is an important distinction between the two approaches, which612
we will now discuss in turn.613
2.3.1. Joint Modeling Approach614
The next approach we discuss is the recently developed Joint Modeling615
framework (Turner et al., 2013b; Turner, 2015; Turner et al., 2015b). The616
Joint Modeling Approach is conceptually similar to the Two-stage Neural Ap-617
proach in that it attempts to relate the parameters of the behavioral model618
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to the parameters of the neural model. However, statistically speaking, the619
Joint Modeling Approach is unique in the way it bridges this connection.620
Specifically, it assumes an overarching distribution that enforces an explicit621
connection between these parameters. The bottom-left panel of Figure 1622
illustrates this connection via the parameters Ω that link θ to δ. In this623
illustration, the connection enforced by Ω is clearly abstract; one must make624
a specific assumption about how θ and δ should coexist in their explanation625
of the underlying cognitive process. As an example, one simple linking func-626
tion used in practice has been the multivariate normal distribution where Ω627
consists of the hyper mean vector and the hyper variance-covariance matrix.628
This connection is important because it allows the information contained in629
the neural data N to affect the information we learn about the behavioral630
model parameters θ.631
Perhaps the greatest benefit of the Joint Modeling Approach is its flexibil-632
ity – it can be applied to different modalities (e.g., fMRI or EEG data), make633
different assumptions about the underlying cognitive process (i.e., changing634
the behavioral submodel), and establish a link at any number of levels in a635
hierarchical model. For example, Turner et al. (2013b) used structural dif-636
fusion weighted imagining data to explain differences in patterns of choice637
response time data across subjects. They showed how a joint model equipped638
with information about the interconnectivity of important brain areas could639
make accurate predictions about a subject’s behavioral performance in the640
absence of behavioral data. Turner et al. (2015b) extended this approach641
to build in brain state fluctuations measured with fMRI into the DDM. The642
problem Turner et al. (2015b) addressed centered on a lack of information643
about within-trial accumulation dynamics. In behavioral choice response644
time experiments, following the presentation of a stimulus, researchers can645
only observe the eventual choice and response time. These data are then646
used to estimate parameters of a cognitive model, following an assumption647
that the data observed on each of these trials arises from the same psycholog-648
ical process. However, this assumption – known as stationarity – is a strong649
one, and is seldom observed in empirical data (e.g., Peruggia et al., 2002;650
Craigmile et al., 2010). Turner et al. (2015b) used a multivariate model to651
describe the joint activation of a set of brain regions of interest, and used652
this description to enhance the classic DDM. In a cross validation test, they653
showed that their extended model could generate better predictions about654
behavioral data than the DDM alone, demonstrating that neurophysiology655
can be used to improve explanations about trial-to-trial fluctuations in be-656
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havior.657
Effectively, the Joint Modeling Approach is a strategy for treating groups658
of parameters as covariates, and this covariation is learned through hierar-659
chical modeling. However, one could imagine an approach for performing660
model-based cognitive neuroscience that is similar to the Two-stage Neural661
approach, but instead of correlating or regressing variables after independent662
analyses, the parameters of the regression equation are estimated. Such an663
approach can be thought of as a Joint Modeling Approach, except the link-664
ing parameters Ω are deterministic. Recently, this approach has been used665
in cognitive neuroscience to link decision models to neural fluctuations. For666
example, Nunez et al. (2015) used EEG data on a perceptual decision making667
experiment as a proxy for attention. They controlled the rate of flickering668
stimuli presented to subjects to match the sampling rate of their EEG data,669
a measure known as the steady-state visual evoked potential. Importantly,670
Nunez et al. (2015) showed that individual differences in attention or noise671
suppression was indicative of the choice behavior, specifically it resulted in672
faster responses with higher accuracy. In a particularly novel application,673
Frank et al. (2015) showed how models of reinforcement learning could be674
fused with the DDM to gain insight into activity in the subthalamic nu-675
cleus (STN). In their study, Frank et al. (2015) used simultaneous EEG and676
fMRI measures as a covariate in the estimation of single-trial parameters.677
Specifically, they used pre-defined regions of interest including the presup-678
plementary motor area, STN, and a general measure of mid-frontal EEG679
theta power to constrain trial-to-trial fluctuations in response threshold, and680
BOLD activity in the caudate to constrain trial-to-trial fluctuations in evi-681
dence accumulation. Their work is important because it establishes concrete682
links between STN and pre-SMA communication as a function of varying re-683
ward structure, as well as a model that uses fluctuations in decision conflict684
(as measured by multimodal activity in the dorsomedial frontal cortex) to685
adjust response threshold from trial-to-trial.686
The major limitation of the Joint Modeling Approach is its complexity,687
which hinders our ability to use the approach effectively in two ways. First, to688
estimate all of the model parameters, we must perform a sophisticated system689
of Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling with updates on separate blocks of690
model parameters (see Turner et al., 2013b; Turner, 2015; Turner et al.,691
2015b, 2013c, for details). This involves deriving the conditional distribution692
of blocks of parameters, and if desired, establishing conjugate relationships693
between the prior and posterior for effective estimation. One example of694
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this has been the use of a multivariate normal assumption to link neural695
and behavioral submodel parameters (Turner et al., 2013b, 2015b). In this696
approach, an increase in any neural measure automatically scales the increase697
in the behavioral model parameters, and vice versa. Second, a great deal of698
data must be available to appreciate the magnitude of the effects of interest.699
This result is driven by a complexity/flexibility tradeoff we discuss below, but700
the basic idea is that as the number of parameters increases, the influence701
the data can have on the joint posterior distribution decreases. When a702
model is complex relative to the data, one simple approach to reduce the703
complexity is to reduce the number of model parameters (Myung and Pitt,704
1997). In hierarchical models like the Joint Modeling Approach, one way to705
accomplish this is to reduce the number of levels in the hierarchy by removing706
its submodels (i.e., models within the Joint Model that explain one subset707
of the data). Such a strategy constitutes our final approach: the Integrative708
approach.709
2.3.2. Integrative Approach710
In the Integrative approach, the goal is to develop a single cognitive model711
capable of predicting both neural and behavioral measures. This approach,712
illustrated in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1, uses one set of parameters713
θ to explain the neural N and behavioral B data jointly. Notice that the714
Integrative approach differs from the Joint Modeling Approach because the715
parameters θ are directly connected to the data – there is no overarching716
distribution Ω to intervene between the data sources. Integrative approaches717
allow the neural data N to have a greater influence on the behavioral data718
B, a statistical property that can be measured by mutual information.719
Of the approaches we have discussed, the Integrative approach is ar-720
guably the most difficult to develop. Its use requires strong commitments721
to both the underlying cognitive process and where this process is executed722
in the brain. One technical hurdle in using an Integrative approach lies in723
the description of random variables with different temporal properties. For724
example, neurophysiological measures are typically observed on a moment-725
by-moment basis, detailing activation in the brain throughout the trial. By726
contrast, behavioral data are typically observed only at the end of a trial,727
such as in any number of perceptual decision making tasks. So, in the instan-728
tiation of a cognitive theory that uses the Integrative approach, we would729
need a moment-by-moment prediction of neural data, and a trial-by-trial730
prediction of the behavioral data, usually assumed to be the result of a se-731
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ries of unobservable (i.e., latent) processes. Given the unique structure of732
Integrative approaches, properly fitting them to data is a difficult task, of-733
ten involving sophisticated techniques such as Hidden Markov Models (e.g.,734
Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson, 2012), or Bayesian change point analyses735
(e.g., Mohammad-Djafari and Fe´ron, 2006).736
Some recent applications of ACT-R have aimed for this Integrative Ap-737
proach. ACT-R assumes the presence of distinct cognitive modules that are738
recruited sequentially during a task. The recruitment of these modules across739
the time course of the task can be represented as a vector of binary outcomes,740
such that a 1 indicates that a module is being used, and a 0 indicates it is not741
being used. This vector naturally lends itself to convolution with the canon-742
ical HRF in the same way as experimental design variables (i.e., called the743
design matrix). The result of the convolution is a model-generated BOLD744
signal that can be compared to empirical data. In this way, the ACT-R745
model can actually be used in both exploratory and confirmatory research.746
When used for exploration, the model-generated BOLD signal is regressed747
against the data in a voxel-by-voxel fashion through the general linear model748
(Borst et al., 2010b; Borst and Anderson, 2013). From this analysis, clus-749
ters of voxels typically emerge, and these clusters are taken to represent750
brain areas where the modules are physically executed. This explorative751
analysis more closely resembles the Latent Input Approach. However, the752
ACT-R model can also be used in a confirmatory fashion (Anderson, 2007;753
Anderson et al., 2008a,b; Borst et al., 2010a). To do this, Anderson and754
colleagues have identified which brain areas should become active during the755
recruitment of different modules (Anderson et al., 2008b; Borst et al., 2015).756
These brain areas were identified primarily from several exploratory analyses757
(Anderson, 2007), but recent work has taken these explorations to generate758
out-of-sample, confirmatory predictions for neural data. In these confirma-759
tory studies, the specific pattern of module activations (i.e., the parameters760
θ) in the model simultaneously affects the model’s predictions for the BOLD761
response and the behavioral outcome. Although global, whole-brain predic-762
tions could be made within this framework, the strict assumption of localized763
module activity in the brain constitutes a fully confirmatory Integrative ap-764
proach, where predictions for neural activity – as well as behavioral data –765
can be quantitatively evaluated.766
The ACT-R framework provides an unique perspective on performing767
the integration between neural and behavioral measures, but actually test-768
ing these models is nontrivial. The major limitation is that one must assume769
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a set of specific modules, and the activation of these modules in the be-770
havioral model is latent, which makes their activation difficult to identify in771
behavioral data. Although neural data facilitate this identification process,772
current solutions rely heavily on assumptions about how modules are rep-773
resented in patterns of neural activity (Anderson, 2012). Furthermore, it is774
unclear how one would objectively decompose other cognitive models into a775
discrete set of modules while preserving their key theoretical and convenient776
properties (for examples of cognitive models in the style of ACT-R, see van777
Maanen and Van Rijn, 2010; van Maanen et al., 2012, 2009). For example,778
the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008) model779
has enjoyed widespread success due to its parsimony and remarkable math-780
ematical tractability. Breaking the LBA model down into its constituent781
parts could compromise this tractability in such a way that estimation of782
the model’s parameters would be nontrivial. Hence, it is clear that not every783
cognitive model can easily be transformed and prepared for an analysis using784
the Integrative Approach. At this point, a natural question to ask is, under785
what conditions should an approach be used for an analysis?786
3. Comparing the Approaches787
It is important to supplement our discussion of approaches to model-788
based cognitive neuroscience with a guide to how these approaches compare.789
This comparison is difficult and likely to be highly subjective. How should790
the various approaches be evaluated? Along what dimensions should they791
be compared and contrasted? Do these approaches cover all possible types792
of linkage between neural and behavioral measures? Despite our fear of im-793
properly considering these questions, we will persist and attempt to organize794
the six core approaches discussed in this article along dimensions that are795
relevant for practical implementation (note that we have grouped both types796
of Two-Stage approaches together for this discussion). Table 1 provides a797
list of key factors that can be used to compare the strengths and weaknesses798
of the approaches.799
3.1. Number of Stages800
The first factor we could compare the approaches on is the number of801
processing stages. The fewest number of stages occur when the approach802
considers both measures simultaneously. Because both the Joint Modeling803
Approach and the Integrative approach make formal assumptions about how804
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both behavioral and neural measures arise, a full computational model is fit to805
the entire set of data in one stage. Another approach requiring only one stage806
is the Direct Input Approach, where the neural data replace dynamics of the807
behavioral model. Here, only the behavioral data are considered while fitting808
the model to data, but this process still only requires a single processing809
stage. The Latent Input and Two-stage approaches typically require the810
greatest number of stages at two or sometimes three. If a separate simulation811
stage is required to generate neural predictions N∗, Latent Input Approaches812
have three stages, whereas if the internal state of a model can be directly813
inferred when the behavioral model is fit to behavioral data (e.g., as in the814
reinforcement models described above), then the Latent Input Approach only815
requires two stages. In the Two-stage approach, if the parameters of the816
behavioral model can be regressed (or correlated with) the raw neural data,817
then only two stages are required. However, if some preliminary analyses818
of the neural data are required, then the Two-stage approach will require819
three stages. Finally, the Theoretical Approach can require anywhere from820
two to an infinite number of stages. In the simplest scenario, the first stage821
consists of observing some pattern or phenomena of interest in the neural822
data, and the second stage consists of the development of a behavioral model.823
However, Theoretical Approaches can also be complex to implement because824
they can involve an extensive, iterative process of running new experiments825
and refining a developing model (Shiffrin and Nobel, 1997).826
3.2. Commitment to a Particular Theory827
The second factor involves the role of flexibility in applying new theories828
to the data. For example, we consider the Two-stage Approach to have weak829
commitment to any particular theory: one could freely use the same proce-830
dure to test any number of behavioral models on the same neural data. The831
commitment to a particular theory is similarly weak in the Latent Input and832
Joint Modeling Approaches, where behavioral models can easily be switched833
out and fits to data compared. We consider the Direct Input Approach to834
be more committed to a particular theory than these aforementioned ap-835
proaches. For example, while Purcell et al. (2010) used neural data to test836
different assumptions about the accumulation process, they still maintained837
a commitment to the sequential sampling framework for these models. In this838
way, their analysis relies on some theoretical assumptions about the accumu-839
lation process, but not in a way that is inflexible. Going one step beyond this840
is the Integrative Approach, which requires strong commitments to a partic-841
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ular modeling framework such as in Anderson and colleagues’ work (e.g.,842
Anderson et al., 2008b; Borst et al., 2015). In this approach, it is difficult to843
imagine testing different models that are not contained within a similar over-844
arching theory. Finally, the Theoretical Approach makes no commitment to845
any particular theory, instead it uses the data to guide the development of846
the theory itself.847
3.3. Type of Information Flow848
Another factor to consider is the type of information flow. In Table 1, we849
consider three types: conceptual, one-way, and two-way. In the Theoretical850
Approach, the neural data can only guide the development of the behavioral851
model conceptually – there is no formal relationship between the behavioral852
and neural measures. At the other extreme, both the Joint Modeling and853
Integrative approaches use the information contained in either measure to854
directly constrain the estimates of the models’ parameters. Hence, we refer855
to this type of information flow as two-way because information flows in856
both directions. When one source of data enforces direct constraint on the857
other measure, we refer to this type of information flow as one-way. All of858
the remaining approaches use information flow that is one-way to maximize859
constraint in their models.860
While on the surface, a one-way information flow may seem a weakness,861
there are sometimes important theoretical reasons for enforcing this strict862
directionality. Consider, for example, the illustrated uses of the Latent Input863
Approach for model discrimination (Mack et al., 2013; Palmeri et al., 2015;864
Purcell et al., 2010, 2012; Palmeri, 2014). Here the goal was to use neural865
data to help discriminate between models of perceptual decision making or866
models of categorization that make the same behavioral predictions. The867
models were fit to the behavioral data in exactly the same way they might868
be fit if neural data were not even considered. No compromises were made869
in the behavioral fits to take into account the neural data, as might be the870
case for the Joint Modeling or Integrative Approaches. Only after the models871
were fit to the behavioral data were the predicted internal states of the model872
then compared to observed neural states in the brain. Finally, models were873
rejected if they could not adequately capture those observed neural states in874
the brain.875
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3.4. Difficulty of Implementation876
From a pragmatic perspective, it is also important to consider the diffi-877
culty of performing analyses with these six approaches. Perhaps the easiest878
approach to implement for the readers of this special issue is the Two-stage879
Approach, where the parameters of a cognitive model are simply regressed880
against a neural signal of interest. Of medium difficulty are the Direct In-881
put and Latent Input Approaches, because they often require model simula-882
tions or additional theoretical overhead to fit the models to data. The Joint883
Modeling and Integrative Approaches are considered difficult to implement884
because they either require sophisticated partitioning of the parameter space885
(e.g., Turner et al., 2015b), or estimation of hidden Markov model parame-886
ters (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson, 2012). Perhaps the most difficult887
approach to implement is the Theoretical Approach, where models must be888
carefully constructed and iteratively fit to data as a test of specific assump-889
tions. To make matters worse, there is no clear end point when developing a890
new cognitive model in the Theoretical Approach.891
3.5. Type of Exploration892
A final consideration is the type of exploration that can be used under a893
specific approach. Approaches can be used for exploratory or confirmatory894
purposes, or some mixture of the two. The Theoretical and Two-stage Ap-895
proaches are considered exploratory because the general strategy involves a896
sequence of tests, iterating toward a solution or explanation of the data. The897
Direct Input Approach is considered a confirmatory approach because the898
neural data are used to directly replace certain mechanisms in the model,899
providing a test of the neural measure’s plausibility in predicting the be-900
havioral response. The Integrative Approach is also confirmatory because it901
makes specific assumptions about how both measures arise, where good fits902
to data support the assumptions of the model, and poor fits refute them.903
We regard the Latent Input Approach as being exploratory when used in904
a typical “model-based” analysis, but confirmatory when used to compare905
models to one another as in Mack et al. (2013) and Purcell et al. (2012). In906
this way, the Latent Input Approach is listed as “either” because the specific907
usage depends on the situation. Finally, the Joint Modeling Approach is also908
considered both confirmatory and exploratory, because its usage depends on909
the how the linking function is specified. For example, one could use a gen-910
eral linear model as the linking function – a confirmatory approach – or one911
could use ambiguous priors on hyperparameters that specify a multivariate912
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Gaussian linking function – an exploratory approach. Furthermore, the spe-913
cific prior used on the hyperparameters allows the Joint Modeling Approach914
to mix between confirmatory and exploratory roles in an analysis.915
4. Choices and Limitations916
In this article, our goal was to highlight and discuss the prominent ap-917
proaches to analysis in the emerging subfield of model-based cognitive neuro-918
science. However, we have not yet provided a guideline for choosing between919
them, nor have we discussed in greater detail the limitations of choosing a920
particular approach. In this section, we will address both of these issues.921
4.1. Choosing Between Approaches922
Although we have described, compared, and contrasted six important923
approaches for analysis, we have not provided a guideline for how these ap-924
proaches could be used to advance psychological theory. We believe that each925
of these approaches have their own utility in the pursuit and development of926
computational models, and the primary factor in choosing between them is927
the goal of the analysis. Furthermore, as a theory progresses, it is important928
to realize that the goals of an analysis should change. To this end, we advo-929
cate using all of these approaches to move from an exploratory analysis to a930
confirmatory one.931
To see how this would work in practice, consider the following stages932
of model development. In the initial stages, one approach is to develop a933
cognitive theory by acknowledging patterns in the data from both the brain934
and the behavior. For example, knowing that the brain must first encode935
stimulus information in lower-level visual areas before a representation of936
the stimulus can be perceived and acted upon could be used to impose order937
in a behavioral model. Such knowledge might motivate the development of a938
visual encoding component of the model that precedes the development of an939
accurate stimulus representation. Instantiation of the encoding process in the940
behavioral model is an implementation of the Theoretical Approach, because941
the development is motivated by brain data. Here, our goal was to simply942
develop a model that abides by certain physiological timing restrictions as a943
way to establish a more constrained stimulus processing order.944
After the development of the model, our goals have advanced – suppose945
we now wish to identify where this encoding component of our model is car-946
ried out, and specifically, which areas of the brain contribute to this process.947
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To accomplish this goal, we would elect to use an exploratory analysis, such948
as the Two-stage or Latent Input Approach. In the Two-stage analysis, we949
would simply fit our behavioral model to the behavioral data, and correlate950
the parameters regulating the encoding process of our model to say, param-951
eters of the HRF in our neural data. Similarly, in the Latent Input analysis,952
we would use the timing of the encoding component in our model to search953
for temporally-related activations in the brain. Both of these analyses consti-954
tute searches through our neural data as a way to better understand how the955
brain produces behavior from a mechanistic perspective. In this way, these956
analyses are unidirectional and do not validate or confirm our model, but957
this is perfectly acceptable because it is consistent with our current goals.958
Our exploratory analyses have paved the way for subsequent investiga-959
tions, and now suppose we wish to use the neural data to better constrain our960
behavioral model. We now have well-defined hypotheses about which brain961
areas are involved in stimulus encoding, and we suspect that the systematic962
activations in these brain areas have a correspondence to the encoding phase963
of our model. At this point, we must reconsider our specific goals. If the964
goal of our analysis is to predict behavior, we might use the Direct Input965
Approach to map activations in the key brain areas directly to the encoding966
component of our model. By contrast, if our goal is to infer relationships be-967
tween the neural and behavioral measures, we might use the Joint Modeling968
Approach to test specific impositions of brain activations to the parameters969
regulating the encoding process in our model. Both of these approaches are970
more confirmatory because they rely on specific hypotheses and assumptions971
that were derived from our exploratory analyses; however, they still only972
guide our inference. In the Direct Input analysis, because our goal was to973
predict the behavioral data, we have compromised our ability to evaluate the974
model’s suitability for the neural data. We cannot make predictions about975
neural data that we have conditioned on, as so we cannot evaluate how well976
the model captures these aspects of our (neural) data. On the other hand,977
the Joint Modeling Approach attempts to capture both aspects of the data978
simultaneously, and as a result, its predictions for the behavioral data are979
compromised by the model’s obligations to the neural data. Because the980
Joint Modeling Approach does not explicitly condition on either variable, it981
can reveal interesting generative properties of our model, but its discrimina-982
tive (i.e., predictive) power is diminished (Bishop and Lasserre, 2007).983
At this point, we have now developed our model and evaluated the re-984
lationships between brain and behavior in a variety of analytic approaches.985
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We know better than anyone in the world where the encoding part of our986
model is carried out in the brain, and how differences in the pattern of ac-987
tivation in these brain areas contribute to behavioral differences. As a final988
test and validation of our model, we can now move to the most confirmatory989
analysis we have discussed here: the Integrative Approach. To establish an990
integrative model, we must first make some specific assumptions about how991
activations in key brain areas map to the encoding component of our model.992
This can be a difficult process, but suppose for now that we have formally993
articulated this mapping in our model, derived from our previous exploratory994
analyses. Our goal now is to show that this integrative version of our model995
can produce patterns of data that match all aspects of our data. That is,996
adjustments of one model parameter should make specific predictions about997
how the pattern of neural and behavioral measures changes, and ideally, how998
these changes could be selectively influenced experimentally (e.g., Heathcote999
et al., 2015). In our opinion, this integrative analysis represents the strongest1000
test of psychological theory, but such a test would be misguided if not first1001
informed by the less integrative approaches.1002
4.2. Limitations of Using These Approaches1003
In our working example above, we identified a few limitations of using var-1004
ious approaches. First, the balancing of fit between behavioral data, neural1005
data, or both is a key consideration in model-based cognitive neuroscience.1006
In general, to optimize predictions for say, behavior, it would be better to1007
condition on neural data. However, if one is more interested in the joint dis-1008
tribution of both neural and behavioral measures, then the modeling goals1009
are more generative than discriminative, and conditioning on one variable1010
would introduce limitations. The authors of the present manuscript have1011
deliberated between these three modeling goals, and arrived at only an am-1012
biguous solution: decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, always1013
with the researcher’s goals in mind.1014
Second, constraint is not always a good thing. If one does not have1015
strong intuition about how components of a model are carried out in the1016
brain, it would be unwise to impose strong constraints on a model. One way1017
of autonomously carrying out justifiable constraint is to use the approaches1018
discussed here along a continuum of increasingly more confirmatory research.1019
As another tack, one could use some of the approaches discussed here to im-1020
pose varying levels of constraint, moderating the levels of analyses between1021
exploratory and confirmatory. For example, in the Joint Modeling Approach,1022
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one can impose a completely uninformative prior on the parameters of the1023
linking function and specify that all parameters of the behavioral model be1024
mapped to the neural data. Such an analysis is wildly explorative, would be1025
difficult to implement, and would convey little information about the covaria-1026
tion between the measures. To move toward a more confirmatory regime, one1027
could impose a stronger prior derived from say, previous research or investiga-1028
tion of the prior predictive distribution (Vanpaemel, 2010, 2011; Vanpaemel1029
and Lee, 2012). Similarly, one could constrain the set of parameters that are1030
related to the neural data by simply setting elements of the linking function1031
to zero. Such an analysis would provide a greater test of the model, but1032
would also force the model to rely more heavily on the joint distribution of1033
the measures.1034
Third, in this article, we have emphasized structural connections that1035
are largely at one level. This is a limitation because the behavioral data1036
can be thought of as the end result of some brain process, again highlight-1037
ing the mismatch between Marr’s (1982) implementation and computational1038
levels of analyses we discussed earlier. Another approach would be to impose1039
structural connections that are multi-level, where a model uses the imple-1040
mentation level to drive some mechanisms, and the computational level to1041
drive others. As a hypothetical example, the implementation level could be1042
used to drive an evidence accumulation process that remains unaffected by1043
experimental instructions (i.e., computational goals), whereas other mecha-1044
nisms such as boundary separation or bias could be carried out by other brain1045
areas that are systematically adjusted in response to task demands. Such a1046
model would bridge the levels of analysis in a way that might actually be1047
reflected in the brain (Frank, 2015).1048
Finally, the imposition of structure need not arise from a model of be-1049
havior. In this article, we have oriented the approaches to analysis around1050
determining where mechanisms in the model are carried out in the brain.1051
However, one can easily imagine reversing the orientation to determining1052
how structural and functional differences in the brain manifest behaviorally.1053
Such an endeavor begins with the development of a generative model of the1054
neural data, usually formed by observing the interconnectedness of key brain1055
regions (Ratcliff and Frank, 2012; Frank, 2006; Wong and Wang, 2006; Ca-1056
vanagh et al., 2011), and ends in mapping the systematic activations of these1057
brain areas to a model of the behavioral data. These models can be difficult1058
to implement and test in the traditional cognitive modeling way (e.g., Lee and1059
Wagenmakers, 2013; Shiffrin et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2015; Busemeyer1060
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and Diederich, 2010), because they rely on many parameters and complex1061
simulations to validate them. However, new methods have been developed1062
to better elucidate simulation-based models (for applications in psychology,1063
see Turner and Van Zandt, 2012; Turner and Sederberg, 2012; Turner et al.,1064
2013a; Turner and Sederberg, 2014; Turner and Van Zandt, 2014; Turner1065
et al., 2015a), and as a result, we may gain new insight and interest in these1066
network-style models in the coming years.1067
4.3. Other Approaches1068
Although the approaches we have presented here encompass the most1069
prevalent approaches to model-based cognitive neuroscience, other approaches1070
have been used to gain a better understanding of how the brain produces a1071
behavior. One structural example is to use some experimental variable that1072
hypothetically affects the neural data to split the behavioral data into dif-1073
ferent levels. Once the behavioral data is divided, the data can be fit and1074
evaluated on the basis of differences in parameter values. One example of1075
this is in Parkinson’s Disease, where drug therapy is commonly administered1076
to compensate for decreased levels of dopamine. Frank (2006) make predic-1077
tions for behavioral data for subjects on and off medication in a Go/NoGo1078
task, and a probabilistic learning task. They used a computational neural1079
network model to make concrete predictions for differences in task behav-1080
ior based on activation of the subthalamic nucleus. Frank (2006) found that1081
their model accurately captured the dynamics of activity in areas of the basal1082
ganglia, and how this pattern of activity related to dynamic adjustments in1083
response thresholds. A similar mechanism was later found in impulse control1084
for Parkinson’s patients with deep brain stimulation using a similar analysis1085
design (Cavanagh et al., 2011).1086
The examples above illustrate an analytic approach where experimental1087
variables guide the analysis of the behavioral data on the basis of how those1088
variables affect the neural data. Another type of analysis takes the effects1089
of the neural data one step further (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2003, 2007, 2009,1090
2011; Kiani et al., 2008; Mazurek et al., 2003). For example, Ratcliff et al.1091
(2009) used single-trial amplitude measures of EEG activity in a perceptual1092
decision making experiment to divide their behavioral data into separate1093
groups. Next, Ratcliff et al. fit the DDM to the data from each of these1094
separate groups and used estimates of the drift rate parameter to show early1095
component EEG signals were not reflective of the decision process, whereas1096
late component EEG signals showed a positive correlation to the stimulus1097
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evidence (i.e., the drift rate). This type of analysis is similar to the Latent1098
Input Approach, but with the flow of information moving from the neural1099
measures to the behavioral ones. By using the neural data to guide the search1100
for differences in behavioral model parameters, we can better understand the1101
mechanistic properties of these neural features by interpreting them in the1102
native language of the decision model.1103
5. Conclusions1104
The field of cognitive science has only begun to realize the full potential of1105
combining brain and behavior as a way to study the mind. However, the field1106
relies on the various approaches developed by different groups of methodolog-1107
ical experts. Due to the seemingly disjoint ways to study cognition, many1108
neuroscientists and cognitive modelers are unaware of their modeling options,1109
as well as the benefits and limitations of different approaches. In this article,1110
we have described the currently prominent general methods for integrating1111
neural and behavioral measures, while providing some examples of their use1112
in cognitive neuroscience. We then attempted to organize these approaches1113
on the basis of a variety of factors: the number of stages, the commitment1114
to a particular theory, the type of information flow, the difficulty of imple-1115
mentation, and the type of exploration. We concluded with a discussion of1116
limitations and further considerations in approaching the integration prob-1117
lem. Our comparison of the approaches (see Figure 1, and Table 1) highlights1118
that a broad spectrum of methods exist for performing model-based cogni-1119
tive neuroscience, and there are important considerations and limitations of1120
each approach. In the end, we conclude that model-based approaches in1121
cognitive neuroscience are extremely important (cf. Schall, 2004; Forstmann1122
et al., 2011, 2015; Mulder et al., 2014; White and Poldrack, 2013), and the1123
choice of analysis strongly depends on the research goal. It seems to us that1124
having a clearly articulated analytic goal in mind serves as the impetus for1125
successful integration between neuroscientific measures and cognitive theory.1126
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